We consider the following communication problem: Alice and Bob each have some valuation functions v 1 (·) and v 2 (·) over subsets of m items, and their goal is to partition the items into S,S in a way that maximizes the welfare, v 1 (S)+v 2 (S). We study both the allocation problem, which asks for a welfare-maximizing partition and the decision problem, which asks whether or not there exists a partition guaranteeing certain welfare, for binary XOS valuations. For interactive protocols with poly(m) communication, a tight 3/4-approximation is known for both [Fei06, DS06] .
Introduction
Intuitively, search problems (find the optimal solution) are considered "strictly harder" than decision problems (does a solution with quality ≥ Q exist?) for the following (formal) reason: once you find the optimal solution, you can simply evaluate it and check whether its quality is ≥ Q or not. The same intuition carries over to approximation as well: once you find a solution whose quality is within a factor α of optimal, you can distinguish between cases where solutions with quality ≥ Q exist and those where all solutions have quality ≤ αQ. The easy conclusion one then draws is that the communication (resp. runtime) required for an α-approximation to any decision problem is upper bounded by the communication (resp. runtime) required for an α-approximation to the corresponding search problem plus the communication (resp. runtime) required to evaluate the quality of a proposed solution.
Note though that for communication problems, in addition to the negligible increase in communication (due to evaluating the quality of the proposed solution), this simple reduction might also require (at least) an extra round of communication (because the parties can evaluate a solution's quality only after it is found). Still, it seems hard to imagine that this extra round is really necessary, and that somehow protocols exist that guarantee an (approximately) optimal solution without (approximately) learning their quality. The surprising high-level takeaway from our main results is that this extra round of communication is provably necessary: Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 provide a natural communication problem (combinatorial auctions) such that a 3/4-approximation for the search problem can be found by a simultaneous protocol 1 with polynomial communication, but every simultaneous prootcol guaranteeing a (3/4 − 1/108 + ε)-approximation for the decision problem requires exp(m) communication.
At this point, we believe our results to have standalone interest, regardless of how we wound up at this specific communication problem. But there is a rich history related to the design of truthful combinatorial auctions motivating our specific question, which we overview below.
Combinatorial Auctions -how did we get here?
In a combinatorial auction, a designer with m items wishes to allocate them to n bidders so as to maximize the social welfare. That is, if bidder i has a monotone valuation function v i : 2 [m] → R + , 2 the designer wishes to find disjoint sets S 1 , . . . , S n maximizing i v i (S i ). The history of combinatorial auctions is rich, and the problem has been considered with and without incentives, with and without Bayesian priors, and in various models of computation (see Appendix A for brief overview). The overarching theme in all of these works is to try and answer the following core question: Are truthful mechanisms as powerful as (not necessarily truthful) algorithms?
For many instantiations of the above question, the answer is surprisingly yes. For example, without concern for computational/communication complexity, the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction is a truthful mechanism that always selects the welfare-maximizing allocation (and therefore achieves welfare equal to that of the best algorithm) [Vic61, Cla71, Gro73] . Of course, the welfare maximization problem is NP-hard and also requires exponential communication between the bidders, even to guarantee a 1/ √ m-approximation. A poly-time algorithm (with polynomial communication) is known to match this guarantee [Rag88, KS98, BKV05] , and interestingly, a polytime truthful mechanism (with polynomial communication) was later discovered as well [LS05] .
polynomial communication achieve a 1/2-approximation (which is trivial -just give the grand
Simultaneous Protocols for Welfare Maximization
In this work, we specifically study the welfare maximization problem for two bidders with binary XOS valuations. 6 Binary XOS valuations are a natural starting point since welfare maximization is especially natural when phrased as a communication problem. Depending on whether one wants to decide the quality of the welfare-optimal allocation, or actually find an allocation inducing the optimal welfare, welfare maximization for binary XOS bidders is equivalent to one of the following: 7 Definition 1.1 (BXOS Decision Problem). Alice is given as input a subsets of [m], A 1 , . . . , A a . Bob is given as input b subsets of [m], B 1 , . . . , B b , and both see input X. Determine whether or not there exists an i, j such that |A i ∪ B j | ≥ X. A protocol is an α-approximation if whenever there exists an i, j such that |A i ∪ B j | ≥ X, it answers yes, and whenever max i,j {|A i ∪ B j |} < X/α it answers no, but may have arbitrary behavior in between. Recall that typically we think of decision problems as being "easier" than allocation/search problems: certainly if you can find a welfare maximizing allocation, you can also determine its welfare (and this claim is formal for interactive protocols with poly(m) communication). Our main result asserts that this intuition breaks down for simultaneous protocols: the decision problem is strictly harder than the allocation/search problem. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first instance of such a separation. Theorem 1.1. There exists a randomized, simultaneous protocol with poly(m) communication that obtains a 3/4-approximation for the BXOS allocation problem. This is the best possible, as even randomized, interactive protocols require 2 Ω(m) communication to do better. Theorem 1.2. For all ε > 0, any randomized, simultaneous protocol that obtains a (3/4−1/108+ε)-approximation for the BXOS decision problem with probability larger than 1/2 + 1/poly(m) requires 2 Ω(m) communication.
Future sections contain more precise versions (that reference the protocols achieving them) of Theorems 1.1 (Theorem 4.1) and 1.2 (Theorem 5.1).
Extensions and Implications for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
Part of the analysis of our protocols actually makes use of the binary assumption (as opposed to holding for general XOS). Part of the analysis, however, does not. In particular, our same protocols when applied to general XOS functions yield a deterministic, simultaneous (3/4−1/32−ε)-approximation for both problems, and a deterministic 2-round (3/4 − ε)-approximation for both problems for general XOS functions.
We are also able to show that a modification of our protocol yields a 1/2-approximation for any number of binary XOS bidders, and that this protocol implies a strictly truthful mechanism. 9 The mechanism is quite different from existing approaches, and could inspire better truthful mechanisms in domains where previous molds (such as VCG-based/maximal-in-range) provably fail [PSS08, BDF + 10, BSS10, DSS15] . Essentially, the designer offers a menu of lotteries to each bidder and the cost of each lottery depends on how "flexible" the option is. So for instance, taking item one deterministically will be more expensive than taking a single item uniformly at random. The pricing scheme is designed exactly so that each bidder is strictly incentivized to follow our simultaneous protocol.
Finally, while our results have standalone merit outside the scope of truthful combinatorial auctions, it is important to properly quantify their impact in this direction. Dobzinski's recent reduction shows that truthful combinatorial auctions with polynomial communication imply simultaneous algorithms for the allocation problem. So Theorem 1.2 does not rule out the possibility of a truthful mechanism for two XOS bidders that requires polynomial communication and guarantees a 3/4-approximation (more on this in Section 6).
Brief Preliminaries and Roadmap
Below we give some brief preliminaries. Section 2 provides a toy setting to help develop intuition for where the gap between allocation and decision problem comes from. Section 3 provides a warmup for our protocols via a 2/3-approximation for the allocation problem and a 3/5-approximation for the decision problem. Sections 4 and 4.1 contain our positive results, and Section 5 contains details on our lower bound.
We'll use the terms "protocol" and "mechanism" to distinguish between cooperative players and strategic players. It will be clear from context exactly our model of communication, what we mean by approximation, truthfulness, etc., and a more formal treatment of this appears in Appendix B. We'll also use the notation SW * (v 1 , ..., v n ) = max S 1 ∩···∩Sn=∅ n i=1 v i (S i ) to denote the maximum social welfare attainable for the valuation profile (v 1 , . . . , v n ).
Below are definitions of the valuation classes used in the paper. These are equivalent to the definitions used in Section 1, but more apt for proofs and less apt for posing easy-to-parse communication problems. Definition 1.3. We consider the following classes of valuations:
• A valuation function v is additive if for every bundle S, v(S) = i∈S v({i}).
• A valuation function v is XOS if there exist additive valuations a 1 , ..., a t such that for every bundle S, v(S) = max t i=1 a i (S). Each a i is called a clause of v.
• A valuation function v is binary additive if v is additive and for every item i, v({i}) ∈ {0, 1}.
We will sometimes refer to a binary additive valuation as a set, referring to {i|v({i}) = 1}.
• A valuation function v is binary XOS if v is XOS and all v's clauses are binary additive valuations. Again, we will sometimes refer to v's clauses as sets to make it more natural to talk about unions/intersections/etc. Observation 1. In the very toy setting, Alice and Bob can guarantee the following tight approximation guarantees with zero communication:
• A 1/2-approximation for the allocation problem with a randomized protocol: give all the items either to Alice or Bob uniformly at random.
• A 1/(M + 1)-approximation for the allocation problem with a deterministic protocol: give all the items to Alice.
• A 1/(2M )-approximation for the decision problem (decide if social welfare ≥ X or ≤ X/(2M ), arbitrary behavior allowed in-between):
Since this example is just to provide intuition, we omit a complete proof. The first bullet should be fairly clear: the optimal welfare is clearly upper bounded by v 1 ([m]) + v 2 ([m]), and the protocol guarantees exactly half of this. The third bullet should also be clear: the optimal welfare is always between 1 and 2M . Moreover, any value in the range is possible (2M if, for instance, v 1 ({1}) = M = v 2 ({2}). 1 if, for instance, v 1 (S) = v 2 (S) = 1 iff S ∋ 1, and v 1 (S) = v 2 (S) = 0 otherwise). So with zero communication, better than 1/(2M ) is not possible. The middle bullet is perhaps the only tricky one. If we give all of the items to Alice, we guarantee welfare v 1 ([m]) ≥ 1, and the optimum is upper bounded by
Again, the purpose of this example is just to provide intuition as to where this gap might come from, and we do not consider it a "result." Of course, one should not expect the gaps to stay quite so drastic as we dial up the communication: with just log M bits in the above example, a deterministic protocol for the allocation problem and decision problem can both guarantee a 1/2-approximation (output v([m])). But this example still captures some of the intuition as to where the gap comes from.
3 Warmup: Beating a 1/2-Approximation Before explaining our protocol, consider the following thought experiment: say instead Alice and Bob are asked to just report a single clause from their valuation. What clause should they choose and how well will this protocol solve the allocation/decision problem? It's not too hard to see that the best they can do is to just report the largest clause in their list (maximizes b i ([m]) over all clauses b j ), which will obtain just a 1/2-approximation for each problem. Now, what if they each report two clauses from their valuations, can they do something more clever? Well, they should certainly try to report clauses that are large, as this lets the other know which sets they value the most. But they should also try to report clauses that are different, as this allows for more flexibility in an allocation that both parties value highly. It's perhaps not obvious what the right tradeoff is between large/different (or even exactly what "different" should formally mean), but it turns out that a good approach is for Alice and Bob to each output the two clauses in their list with the largest union (i.e. output b i , b j maximizing SW * (b i , b j )). Subject to figuring out how to translate this information into solutions, a slight variant of this protocol guarantees a 2/3-approximation for the allocation problem, and a 3/5-approximation for the decision problem, and the proof is actually quite simple. Note below that Theorem 3.1 holds only for BXOS, whereas Theorem 3.2 holds for general XOS. We'll provide both proofs below first, followed by a brief discussion.
Theorem 3.1. Protocol 1 gives a 2/3-approximation to the 2-party BXOS allocation problem.
Proof. First, we want to claim that if Alice sents b j to the auctioneer, then the resulting welfare is at least SW * (b j , v 2 ). This is actually an instantiation of a claim we will want to reference later, so we'll state a more general form below: Proof. Let A denote the set of items for which b 1 ({i}) = 1, and consider any other allocation (B,B). We first reason that we can remove from B all items / ∈ A without hurting b j (B) + v 2 (B). This is trivial to see, as b j has value 0 for all items / ∈ A. Next, we reason that we can add to B any item ∈ A without hurting b j (B) + v 2 (B). To see this, observe that we are certainly increasing b j (B) by 1 when we make this change, as b j is just additive and b j ({i}) = 1 for all i ∈ A. In addition, we can't possibly decrease v 2 (B) by more than 1, as all of the clauses in v 2 are binary additive (and therefore have value at most 1 for any item). So again, the total change is only positive. At the end of these changes, observe that we have now transitioned from (B,B) to (A,Ā) without losing any welfare, and therefore (A,Ā) is indeed optimal.
Claim 1 immediately lets us conclude that the expected welfare guaranteed by Protocol 1 is at least
. Now, let S and T be the optimal allocation to achieve SW * (v 1 , v 2 ). Let a be the clause of v 1 such that a(S) = v 1 (S). Let a ′ be the clause of v 2 such that a
In expectation, the social welfare we get in the protocol is at least:
Theorem 3.2. Protocol 2 gives a 3/5-approximation to the 2-party XOS allocation problem and the 2-party XOS decision problem. 11
Proof. Let S and T be the optimal allocation to achieve SW * (v 1 , v 2 ). Let a be the clause of v 1 such that a(S) = v 1 (S). Let a ′ be the clause of v 2 such that a to the auctioneer simultaneously. 2: For allocation problem: Auctioneer finds j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, j ′ ∈ {4, 5, 6} that maximizes SW * (b j , b ′ j ′ ) and allocate items according to it. 3: For decision problem: Let X be the parameter in the decision problem. Auctioneer finds j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, j ′ ∈ {4, 5, 6} that maximizes
U and U ′ be the allocation to achieve SW * (b 2 , b 3 ). We know that b 2 (U )+b 3 (U ′ ) ≥ a(S)+b 1 (T ). Let W and W ′ be the allocation to achieve SW * (b 5 , b 6 ). We know that
Then we have
Similarly we have
The social welfare we get in the protocol is at least
From this, it is easy to check that Protocol 2 gives a 3/5-approximation to both the 2-party XOS allocation problem and the 2-party XOS decision problem.
So now there are two remaining questions: first, how does one generalize the reasoning in Protocols 1 and 2 to multiple clauses? And second, why the heck is there a difference between their guarantees for the allocation and decision problem for binary XOS valuations? For the first question, we'll postpone the details to Section 4, but just note here that our full protocols indeed makes use of similar reasoning. For the second, observe that Claim 1 is somewhat magical: if Alice's valuation is binary additive, and Bob's is binary XOS, then it is possible to allocate the items optimally without any input from Bob (other than the knowledge that his valuation is indeed binary XOS). While it's not obvious that Claim 1 should necessarily be quite so helpful (given that we do, in fact, get input from Bob), this turns out to be the crucial difference between the allocation and decision problem. At a high level, there is necessarily some information lost between Alice's valuation and her message (ditto for Bob). The decision problem requires us to deal with both losses, but Claim 1 lets certain kinds of protocols only worry about the loss from Alice.
Developing Good Sketches
In this section, we define "sketches" in some specific forms for binary XOS valuations. 12 They are the main ingredients in our protocols and mechanisms. At a high level, the sketches are trying to simultaneously maximize the size of the reported clauses, while also keeping on eye on reporting "different" clauses. One can interpret the negative term as a "regularizer" that achieves this goal.
Definition 4.1 (Sketches of binary XOS valuations). For a binary XOS valuation v, define its
i , where a 1 , ..., a t are the clauses of v and
Remark 4.1. For the sketches defined above, there might be multiple (b 1 , ..., b k )'s maximize the term. When we use a (k, α)-sketch in some protocol, we will use an arbitrary one. Additionally, note that our warmup protocols from Section 3 ask Alice and Bob to output both their (1, 1/2)-sketch and their (2, 1/2)-sketch.
In Appendix D, we prove some simple properties of these sketches, and an extension of the definition to non-binary XOS valuations. Essentially, what the lemmas are stating is that for any set A, the sketches defined above do a "good enough" job capturing Alice's (/Bob's) value for A. Note that "good enough" doesn't mean "captures v(A) within a constant factor," as this is impossible with a concise sketch [BDF + 12]. "Good enough" simply means that the sketch can be used inside a similar approach to Section 3.
Once sketches from Alice and Bob are in hand, there are a couple natural ways to "wrap up" the allocation/decision problem. We'll formally name these and refer to them in future protocols:
• Alice-Only Allocation (randomized): Pick a clause uniformly at random from Alice's sketch, award to Alice items for which that clause values at 1, and the rest to Bob.
• Best Known Allocation (deterministic): If Alice reports clauses a 1 , . . . , a k , and Bob reports clauses b 1 , . . . , b k , find i, j maximizing SW * (a i , b j ). Allocate items according to the allocation that yields SW * (a i , b j ).
• Best Known Decision(α, X) (deterministic): If Alice reports clauses a 1 , . . . , a k , and Bob reports clauses
Our Protocols and Mechanisms
In this section, we'll describe all protocols used to provide our positive results. All protocols involve Alice and Bob reporting a (k, α)-sketch, and then using the Alice-Only or Best Known Allocation, or making the Best Known Decision. All proofs are in Appendix E thru G. We make two remarks before proceeding: 1. All of the high-level intuition for why the protocols work is captured by the sketches. Many of the actual proofs are different, but at a high level everything comes down to the fact that this class of sketches selects "the right" clauses to report for welfare maximization.
2. Any protocol that eventually uses the Alice-Only Allocation doesn't require Alice to report her entire sketch (she can just draw the random clause herself as in Protocol 1 (and have communication m for any choice of k). While we state the guarantees for such protocols for a fixed k, one can actually take k → ∞ without increasing the communication at all.
Theorem 4.1. The following protocols achieve the following guarantees:
Before continuing, we briefly remark the following:
• The 3/4-approximation guaranteed by the protocol in the first row is tight: randomized, interactive protocols require exponential communication to beat a 3/4-approximation.
• The second and third protocols also work for general XOS (subject to updating the sketching definition as in Appendix D).
• It is still open whether it is possible to beat 23/32 with a deterministic protocol for the allocation problem, but 23/32 is optimal for any protocol using the Best Known Allocation after Alice and Bob each report a (k, α i ) sketch (see Lemma F.1 in Appendix F.1). Additional applications of our sketches appear in Appendix F.2 and G, including a 2-round protocol guaranteeing a 3/4-approximation for general XOS valuations, and our strictly truthful mechanism. The strictly truthful mechanism essentially visits bidders one at a time, asks for a (k, 1/2)-sketch on the remaining items, awards them the "Alice-Only Allocation" for their reported sketch, and charges payments to ensure strict truthfulness.
Lower Bounds
Finally, we overview our lower bound for the BXOS decision problem (which implies Theorem 1.2). We begin with some intuition: Alice and Bob will each get exponentially many clauses of size m/2. These sets will be random, but not uniformly random. 13 Instead, they are drawn in such a way that the union of two random clauses of Alice and Bob has size (3/4 − 1/108)m in expectation. At this point, the optimal welfare is (3/4 − 1/108)m if we don't further adjust their inputs. Finally, we modify the construction either by hiding or not hiding a 0 within Alice's input and b 0 within Bob's input such that a 0 ∪ b 0 = [m], in a matter so that these sets are indistinguishable from the rest. Therefore, the answer to the decision problem rests on whether or not Alice and Bob each have this hidden set, but they have no means by which to convey this information as this set looks indistinguishable from the rest. This description captures all of the intuition for our construction, which appears in Appendix H along with a proof of Theorem 5.1 below.
Theorem 5.1. For any constant ε > 0, there exists a distribution over binary XOS valuations such that no simultaneous, randomized protocol with less than e 2Cm/9 communication can guarantee an α-approximation to the 2-party BXOS decision problem with probability larger than 1 2 + 2e −Cm/9 . Here α = 3/4 − 1/108 + ε and C = 2ε 2 .
13 If they were uniformly random, then Alice and Bob can guarantee 3m/4 in expectation by just reporting a single arbitrary clause, because two uniformly random sets of size m/2 have union 3m/4 in expectation.
Discussion and Future Work
Our main result shows a simultaneous protocol guaranteeing a 3/4-approximation for the BXOS allocation problem, and a lower bound of 3/4 − 1/108 for for the BXOS decision problem. The bigger picture behind these results, even without consideration of truthful combinatorial auctions, is the following:
• It is surprising that the decision problem is strictly harder than the allocation/search problem.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first instance of such a separation.
• It is surprising that a (> 1/2)-approximation for either the allocation or decision problem is possible at all, given the strong lower bounds already known on sketching valuation functions, but we are able to get a tight 3/4-approximation for the allocation problem.
• A 3/4-approximation for the decision problem now serves as a new example of what can be achieved in polynomial interactive communication (in fact, two rounds by Theorem F.2), but requires exponential simultaneous communication. While such problems are already known, this has a very different flavor than previous constructions, and will likely be a useful tool for this reason. The most obvious question is to resolve whether or not there is a 3/4-approximation for the allocation problem with general XOS functions. If there isn't, this would provide the first separation between truthful and non-truthful protocols with polynomial communication via Dobzinski's reduction [Dob16b] . Additionally, whether or not our protocol can be de-randomized is an enticing open question: if no matching deterministic protocol can be found (implying a lower bound of < 3/4 for deterministic protocols for the allocation problem), this would provide the first separation between truthful and non-truthful deterministic protocols (Dobzinski's reduction preserves determinism). If our protocol can in fact be de-randomized, this would be fascinating, as this protocol would deterministically guarantee a 3/4-approximation without learning the welfare it achieves. 14 Finally, while we have provided simultaneous protocols for the allocation problem with approximation guarantees strictly better than 1/2 when bidders have XOS valuations, it still remains open whether or not a truthful mechanism can obtain a (> 1/2)-approximation for two-player combinatorial auctions with XOS bidders.
A Background on Related Work
There is an enormous literature of related work on combinatorial auctions. The state-of-the-art without concern for incentives is a 1/2-approximation for any number of subadditive bidders [Fei06] , and numerous improvements for special cases, such as submodular bidders [DS06, Fei06, FV06] . With concern for incentives, the state-of-the-art (for worst-case approximation ratios and dominant strategy truthfulness) is an 1/O( √ log m)-approximation for XOS bidders, again with improvements for further special cases [DRY11] . The problem has also been studied in Bayesian settings, where a generic black-box reduction is known if the designer only desires Bayesian truthfulness 15 [HL10, HKM11, BH11] . If the designer desires dominant strategy truthfulness but is okay with an average-case welfare guarantee, then a 1/2-approximation is known for XOS bidders [FGL15] . Combinatorial auctions have also been studied through the lens of Price of Anarchy, but a deeper discussion of this is outside the scope of this paper [BR11, PLST12, ST12, ST13, FFGL13, CP14, DFK15, DMSW15, LLN01, CKS08, BMW16, FFMR16].
On the topic of simultaneous versus interactive communication, [Yao79] proposed the 2-party simultaneous communication model when communication complexity was introduced. [PS82] , [DGS84] , [NW93] showed that in the 2-party case, there is an exponential gap between k and (k − 1)-round deterministic/randomized communication complexity of an explicit function. In the multiparty number-on-forehead communication model [CFL83] , [BGKL03] showed an exponential gap between simultaneous communication complexity and communication complexity for up to (log n) 1−ε players for any ε > 0. [DNO14] recently showed that in combinatorial auctions with unit demand bidders/subadditive bidders, there is an exponential gap (exponential in the number of players) between simultaneous communication complexity and communication complexity. In comparison to these works, our separation between simultaneous and interactive communication for the 2-player BXOS decision problem is of a quite different flavor, and makes the available toolkit for future results more diverse.
B Formal Preliminaries
Here, we provide more formal details surrounding our model of communication, approximation, truthful mechanisms, etc.
In a combinatorial auction, there are n players and m items. In 2-party case, we call the first player Alice and the second player Bob. Each player i has a valuation function v i : 2 [m] → R + . (We require v i (∅) = 0.) The goal for the auctioneer is to find an allocation S 1 , ..., S n (S 1 ∩ · · · ∩ S n = ∅) to maximize the social welfare n i=1 v i (S i ). 1. When we use "protocol", it means that players honestly follow the protocol and the challenge is to make the protocol have good approximation ratio, polynomial communication cost and possibly small number of rounds. In this paper, we use the standard communication complexity model and we allow public randomness and private randomness. For details, we refer the reader to [KN97] . We want to emphasize two relevant properties of the communication protocols here:
(a) We care about the number of rounds of a protocol. In each round, all the messages need to be sent simultaneously. We use "simultaneous protocols" to denote protocols with only one round of communication. (b) All the protocols discussed in this paper are in the "blackboard model." In the blackboard model, each message is broadcasted. Or in other words, each message is written on a blackboard for all players and the auctioneer to see. In some protocol, we don't really need broadcast, we will specify where is the message from and sent to in those protocols.
2. When we use "mechanism," it means that players might not tell the truth and we need to incentivize the players to cooperate. A mechanism in this paper can be considered as a protocol together with an allocation rule and a payment rule. Let the protocol be π and the transcript be Π. For i = 1, ..., n, let S i be the allocation rule and p i be the payment of player i. Player i's utility is defined as
The expectation is over the randomness of the mechanism.
We further define the truthful mechanism as the following. Let m i be the message sent by player i. m i is a function of v i and the history of the protocol. Here we only make the definition for the case when each player sends at most one message in the protocol and all the mechanisms in this paper are in this case. We say that m i is a dominant strategy (in expectation
We say that a mechanism is a truthful mechanism if there exist dominant strategies for all players. One of our goals in this paper is to find an allocation that achieves good approximation of the maximum social welfare SW * (v 1 , ..., v n ) (defined as allocation problem in Section 1). We say a protocol is α-approximation if for all v 1 , ..., v n ,
We say a truthful mechanism is α-approximation if for all v 1 , ..., v n there exist dominant strategies m 1 , ..., m n for player 1, ..., n guaranteeing:
C Tools for proofs C.1 Information Theory
Here we briefly review some facts and definitions from information theory that will be used in this paper. For a more detailed introduction, we refer the reader to [CT06] . Throughout this paper, we use log to refer to the base 2 logarithm and use ln to refer to the natural logarithm.
Definition C.1. The entropy of a random variable X, denoted by H(X), is defined as H(X) =
If X is drawn from Bernoulli distributions B(p), we use H(p) = −(p log p + (1 − p)(log(1 − p)) to denote H(X).
Definition C.2. The conditional entropy of random variable X conditioned on random variable Y is defined as H(X|Y ) = E y [H(X|Y = y)]. 
C.2 Concentration Bound
Definition C.5 (Negative Correlation). Let X 1 , ..., X n be n random variables supported on {0, 1}. We say X 1 , ..., X n are negatively correlated if for all S ⊆ [n],
Lemma C.1 (Generalized Chernoff Bound [PS97] ). Let X 1 , ..., X n be n random variables supported on {0, 1} and they are negatively correlated. Then for any a > 0,
D Missing Definitions and Proofs of Section 4
Here we give an extension of Definition 4.1 to non-binary XOS valuations. It is easy to verify that Definition 4.1 and Definition D.1 are equivalent for binary XOS valuations.
Definition D.1 (Sketches of XOS valuations). For a XOS valuation v, define its
Here a 1 , ..., a t are the clauses of v and
Now we prove some simple properties of these sketches.
Let a be a clause of v and A ⊆ {i|a({i} = 1}. We have
Here
Proof. Because x i ≤ 1 and α ≤ 1/2, we have 2α · i∈{i|a({i}=1}\A
So if we can prove the lemma for the case when A = {i|a({i} = 1}, it will directly imply the lemma for the case when A {i|a({i} = 1}. From now on, we will assume A = {i|a({i} = 1}. By Definition 4.1, (b 1 , ..., b k ) are some clauses of v that maximize
This implies
Summing over all j ∈ [k], we get
Lemma D.2. Let (b 1 , ..., b k ) be the (k, α)-sketch of some XOS valuation v. Let α ≤ 1/2. Let a be a clause of v. a ′ is an additive valuation and for all i, a({i}) ≥ a ′ ({i}). We have
Proof. Because x i,u ≤ 1 and α ≤ 1/2, similarly as Lemma D.1, it suffices to prove the case when a ′ = a. By Definition D.1, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, if we replace b j with a,
Notice that
E Protocols for BXOS parties E.1 Simultaneous protocol for two BXOS parties (implies Theorem 1.1)
Protocol 3 Simultaneous protocol for 2-party combinatorial auctions with binary XOS valuations 1: Alice computes the (k, 1/2)-sketch (b 1 , ..., b k ) of her valuation v 1 . Then she picks j uniformly randomly from {1, ..., k} and sends b j to the auctioneer. 2: For each item i, the auctioneer allocates it to Alice if b j ({i}) = 1; otherwise allocate it to Bob. Theorem E.1. Protocol 3 gives a (3/4 − 1/k)-approximation in expectation to the 2-party BXOS allocation problem.
Proof. Let S and T = [m]\S be the allocation that achieves the optimal social welfare between v 1 and v 2 (if there are multiple such allocations, just pick an arbitrary one). Let a be some clause of v 1 such that v 1 (S) = a(S) and a ′ be some clause of v 2 such that v 2 (T ) = a ′ (T ). Let A = {i|a({i}) = 1} ∩ S and A ′ = {i|a ′ ({i}) = 1} ∩ T . We have A ∩ A ′ = ∅. The optimal social welfare is
Therefore,
Define B j = {i|b j ({i}) = 1} and B j = [m]\B j . By Claim 1, the expected social welfare Protocol 3 gets is 
E.2 Sequential protocol for multiple BXOS parties
Protocol 4 Sequential protocol for multi-party combinatorial auctions with binary XOS valuations 1: for l = 1, ..., n − 1 do
2:
The l-th player computes the (k, 1/2)-sketch (b l 1 , ..., b l k ) of her valuation v l for items that are left. Then she picks j uniformly randomly from {1, ..., k} and broadcasts b l j .
3:
For each item i left, the auctioneer allocates it to the l-th player if b l j ({i}) = 1. 4: end for 5: Allocate the left items to the n-th player.
Theorem E.2. Protocol 4 gives a (1/2 − 1/k)-approximation in expectation to the n-party BXOS allocation problem.
Proof. Let C(n) − 1/k be the approximation ratio of Protocol 4 on n players. We prove the theorem by induction on n. By Theorem 3, C(2) ≥ 3/4. For any n ≥ 3, let S 1 , S 2 , ..., S n be the allocation that achieves the optimal social welfare. For l ∈ [n], let a l be the clause of v l such that a l (S l ) = v l (S l ) and A l = {i : a l ({i}) = 1} ∩ S l . Therefore SW * (v 1 , ..., v n ) = |A 1 | + · · · + |A n |.
Notice this not exactly from the statement of Lemma D.1, but it is explicit from the proof of Lemma D.1. Let B j = {i|b 1 j ({i}) = 1}. In Protocol 4, player 1 will get welfare
After player 1 takes all the items in B j , the other players can at least get welfare |A ′ \B j | if we allocate items optimally. By induction, in Protocol 4, players 2 to n will get welfare (C(n − 1)− 1/k)·|A ′ \B j | conditioned on player 1 gets B j . So in expectation, players 2 to n will get welfare at least
So in expectation, Protocol 4 gets welfare at least
So we have
This means C(n − 1) ≥ 1/2 would imply C(n) ≥ 1/2. As C(2) ≥ 3/4, we know that C(n) ≥ 1/2 for all n ≥ 2.
F Protocols for XOS parties 
Theorem F.1. Protocol 5 gives a (23/32 − 1/k)-approximation to the 2-party XOS allocation problem and the 2-party XOS decision problem.
Proof. Let allocation (S, T = [m]\S) achieves SW
. Let a 1 be the clause of v 1 such that a 1 (S) = v 1 (S) and a 2 be the clause of
. We have
So what Protocol 5 gets is at least
While we don't know whether or not 23/32 is in general tight for simultaneous protocols for XOS valuations, the analysis of Protocol 5 (and protocols like it) is indeed tight:
Lemma F.1. For any constant ε > 0, there exist binary XOS valuations v 1 and v 2 with sufficiently large m such that simultaneous protocols in the following form won't get
So in order to prove the lemma, it suffices to show that both a 1 0 and a 2 0 cannot not appear in Alice and Bob's sketches for arbitrary positive integers k 1 , k 2 and 0 ≤ α 1 , α 2 ≤ 1/2. Wlog, we will only show a 1 0 cannot not appear in the (k, α)-sketch of v 1 for arbitrary positive integer k and
.., b k ) be the term that this sketch is trying to maximize by choosing b 1 , ..., b k over a 1 0 , ..., a 1 t . Recall that
Suppose a 1 0 appears in the sketch. Wlog assume
We can always find such l by averaging argument. We have
We have to do a case analysis for term
Now we assume k > 1. We have
Now we get a contradiction. So a 1 0 cannot be in the sketch.
F.2 Two-round protocol for two XOS parties
Protocol 6 Two-round, deterministic protocol for 2-party combinatorial auctions with XOS valuations 1: Alice computes the (k, 1/2)-sketch (b 1 , ..., b k ) of her valuation v 1 and sends it to Bob. Bob find j that maximize SW (b j , v 2 ), and sends SW (b j , v 2 ) together with the allocation that achieves SW (b j , v 2 ) to the auctioneer. 2: For allocation problem: The auctioneer allocates items according to the allocation provided by Bob. 3: For decision problem: Let X be the parameter in the decision problem. If
Theorem F.2. Protocol 6 gives a (3/4−1/k)-approximation to the 2-party XOS allocation problem and the 2-party XOS decision problem.
Proof. Let allocation (S, T = [m]\S) achieves SW * (v 1 , v 2 ). Let a 1 be the clause of v 1 such that a 1 (S) = v 1 (S) and a 2 be the clause of v 2 such that a 2 (T ) = v 2 (T ). Let a ′ 1 , a ′ 2 be two additive valuations such that a ′ 1 (R) = a 1 (S ∩ R) and a ′ 2 (R) = a 2 (T ∩ R) for all R ⊆ [m]. We have
G Truthful mechanism for multiple binary XOS parties
In this section, we will show how to transform Protocol 3 and Protocol 4 into truthful mechanisms. Since Protocol 3 is a special case of Protocol 4, we will only do the transformation for Protocol 4.
Mechanism 7
Truthful mechanism for multi-party combinatorial auctions with binary XOS valuations 1: for l = 1, ..., n − 1 do
2:
The l-th player broadcasts k binary additive valuations (b l 1 , ..., b l k ).
3:
The auctioneer picks j uniformly randomly from {1, ..., k} and broadcasts j. For each item i left, the auctioneer allocates it to the l-th player if b l j ({i}) = 1 and charges the l-th player
. 4: end for 5: Allocate the left items to the n-th player.
Theorem G.1. In Mechanism 7, for any l ∈ {1, ..., n − 1} and any history before the l-player, if
Note that this is not tight -a simple observation shows how to turn the (1 − 1/e)-approximation of [Fei06, DS06] into a truthful mechanism for binary XOS bidders. One noteworthy difference is that in Mechanism 7, following the intended protocol is strictly more profitable than any deviation. In the previous mechanisms, all bidders get zero utility no matter what they do. Mechanism 7 is also considerably simpler than the previous mechanisms.
Proof. Wlog, it suffices to prove the theorem for the first player.
Let
and B j = {i|b 1 j {i} = 1}. The expected utility of the first player is
Assume (b 1 1 , ..., b 1 k ) maximizes the first player's expected utility. We are going to first show that b 1 1 , ..., b 1 k are all clauses of v 1 . We prove by contradiction. Wlog suppose b 1 1 is not a clause of v 1 . We want to show that (b 1 1 , ..., b 1 k ) does not maximize the first player's expected utility. Let a t be a clause of v 1 such that v 1 (B j ) = a t (B j ). Let A t = {i|a t ({i}) = 1}. There are two cases:
1. B j ⊆ A t : If the first player reports (a t , b 1 2 , ..., b 1 k ) instead of (b 1 1 , ..., b 1 k ), her expected utility will be increased by
So the first player will get strictly more utility if she reports (
Let a ′ be the binary additive valuation such that a ′ ({i}) = ½ i∈A ′ for i = 1, ..., m. We know that a ′ = b 1 1 . If the first player reports (a ′ , b 1 2 ..., b 1 k ) instead of (b 1 1 , ..., b 1 k ), her expected utility will be increased by
We know that a t (A ′ ) = a t (B j ), so above term is strictly larger than 0. So the first player will get strictly more utility if she reports (a ′ , b 1 2 , ..., b 1 k ) instead of (b 1 1 , ..., b 1 k ). Now we have shown that b 1 1 , ..., b 1 k are all clauses of v 1 . The expected utility of the first player can be written as
This is k times what we want to maximize in the (k, 1/2)-sketch. So when (b 1 1 , ..., b 1 k ) maximizes the first player's expected utility, it's also a (k, 1/2)-sketch of v 1 .
H Missing Proof of Section 5
We now provide a little more detail for the construction. Any claims in the first six bullets are straight-forward without any background in information theory. Formalizing the final bullet is the only tricky part, but will probably appear straight-forward to experts in information theory. The real interest lies in the construction itself.
• First, draw S to be a uniformly random set of size m/2. Draw T uniformly random among all sets of size m/2 with S ∩ T = m/3. Alice will know S (but not T , only that S ∩ T = m/3), and Bob will know T (but not S).
• Each of Alice's (exponentially many) clauses a i are drawn uniformly random among sets such that |a i ∩ S| = m/3 and |a i ∩S| = m/6. In other words, Alice's sets are all of size m/2, and all intersect S more than a uniformly random set.
• Each of Bob's (exponentially many) clauses b i are drawn uniformly random among sets such that |b i ∩ T | = m/3 and |b i ∩T | = m/6. • At this point, with very high probability, the optimal welfare is (3/4 − 1/108)m.
• Now, notice that there exist (many possible) a 0 0 such that |a 0 0 ∩ S| = m/3 = |a 0 0 ∩ T |. There also exist (many possible) a 1 0 such that |a 1 0 ∩ S| = m/3 = |ā 1 0 ∩ T |. So with probability 1/2, add the clause a 0 0 to both Alice and Bob's input. With probability 1/2, add the clause a 1 0 to Alice's clauses and b 1 0 =ā 1 0 to Bob's.
• We can prove that in case 0, we haven't improved the welfare at all, while in case 1 the welfare has improved to m. So in order to obtain better than a (3/4 − 1/108) approximation for the decision problem, Alice and Bob must figure out whether they are in case 0 or case 1.
• But doing so requires someone to communicate useful information about either a 0 or b 0 , which is impossible since all sets appear a priori indistinguishable and there are exponentially many of them.
Theorem H.1 (Restatement of Theorem 5.1). For any constant ε > 0, there exists a distribution over binary XOS valuations such that no simultaneous protocol with communication cost less than e 2Cm/9 can have an α-approximation to the 2-party BXOS decision problem with probability larger than 1 2 + 2e −Cm/9 . Here α = 3/4 − 1/108 + ε and C = 2ε 2 . Proof. This proof uses mutual information (Definition C.3) and other information theory tools. We also use generalized Chernoff bound for negatively correlated random variables. We mention these tools in Appendix C.
To start the proof, we sample Alice and Bob's valuations v 1 and v 2 from the below procedure. It's basically following the ideas above. Sampling in this specific way will make the later part of the proof easier. Here M is the bit we want to hide in Alice and Bob's inputs. Later we will show M is equal to the output of the decision problem with high probability. Since we are working on a specific distribution, wlog we can assume the simultaneous protocol is deterministic. Let Π 1 be the message sent by Alice and Π 2 be the message sent by Bob in the simultaneous protocol. The rest of the proof proceeds in two steps. We will first show that Π 1 and Π 2 together convey very little information about M to the auctioneer using information theoretic argument. After that, we will show that if the auctioneer has very little information about M , she cannot solve BXOS decision problem with large probability.
For the first step, we prove the following lemma. It's basically stating that I(Π 1 Π 2 ; M ) -the mutual information (Definition C.3) between Π 1 Π 2 (messages sent by Alice and Bob) and the bit M is no more than the length of messages over the number of sets Alice/Bob has in its input. Here's an overview of the proof. The proof can be broken down into two parts. In the first part we show I(Π 1 Π 2 ; M ) is upper bounded by I(Π 1 ; U 1 |S) + I(Π 2 ; U 2 |T ). As defined above, U 1 and U 2 are special sets which contain information about M . The proof of the first part is roughly just to use independence of random variables and the fact that M is a function of U 1 and U 2 to transit through mutual information terms. In the second part of the proof, we show I(Π 1 ; U 1 |S) ≤
The idea is that when only S is given, U 1 looks similar to other sets in Alice's input. We can prove that the amount of information Π 1 conveys about U 1 is the same as the amount of information Π 1 conveys about some other set in Alice's input. As Π 1 's entropy is at most its length, we can conclude
Proof. Since M is independent with S and T , we have I(Π 1 Π 2 ; M ) ≤ I(Π 1 Π 2 ST ; M ) = I(ST ; M ) + I(Π 1 Π 2 ; M |ST ) = 0 + I(Π 1 Π 2 ; M |ST ).
Since M is a function of U 1 and U 2 (M = ½ U 1 =U 2 ), we have I(Π 1 Π 2 ; M |ST ) ≤ I(Π 1 Π 2 ; U 1 U 2 |ST ) = I(Π 1 ; U 1 U 2 |ST ) + I(Π 2 ; U 1 U 2 |ST Π 1 ).
Notice that I(Π 2 ; U 1 U 2 |ST Π 1 ) = I(Π 2 ; U 1 U 2 Π 1 |ST ) − I(Π 2 ; Π 1 |ST ) ≤ I(Π 2 ; U 1 U 2 Π 1 |ST ) = I(Π 2 ; U 1 U 2 |ST ) + I(Π 2 ; Π 1 |ST U 1 U 2 ) ≤ I(Π 2 ; U 1 U 2 |ST ) + I(v 2 ; v 1 |ST U 1 U 2 ) = I(Π 2 ; U 1 U 2 |ST ).
The second last step is because Π 1 is a function of v 1 and Π 2 is a function of v 2 . The last step is because after S, T, U 1 , U 2 are sampled, v 1 and v 2 are sampled using independent randomness.
It's easy to check that when S, T are given, U 2 is a function of U 1 . So we have I(Π 1 ; U 1 U 2 |ST ) = I(Π 1 ; U 1 |ST ) = I(Π 1 ; U 1 T |S) − I(Π 1 ; T |SU 1 ) ≤ I(Π 1 ; U 1 T |S) = I(Π 1 ; U 1 |S) + I(Π 1 ; T |SU 1 ) ≤ I(Π 1 ; U 1 |S) + I(v 1 ; T |SU 1 ) = I(Π 1 ; U 1 |S).
The second last step is because Π 1 is a function of v 1 . The last step is because when fixing S and U 1 , v 1 is independent with T . Similarly we also get I(Π 2 ; U 1 U 2 |ST ) ≤ I(Π 2 ; U 2 |T ).
So far, we get I(Π 1 Π 2 ; M ) ≤ I(Π 1 Π 2 ; M |ST ) ≤ I(Π 1 ; U 1 U 2 |ST ) + I(Π 2 ; U 1 U 2 |ST Π 1 ) ≤ I(Π 1 ; U 1 U 2 |ST ) + I(Π 2 ; U 1 U 2 |ST ) ≤ I(Π 1 ; U 1 |S) + I(Π 2 ; U 2 |T ).
Finally, we just need to bound I(Π 1 ; U 1 |S) and I(Π 2 ; U 2 |T ). First it's easy to check that when S is fixed, A J 1 is also distributed as D S . Therefore given S, fixing J 1 does not change v 1 's distribution . So I(v 1 ; J 1 |S) = 0. As Π 1 is a function of v 1 , we also have I(Π 1 ; J 1 |S) = 0. Therefore, Similarly we have
To sum up, we get I(Π 1 Π 2 ; M ) ≤ I(Π 1 ; U 1 |S) + I(Π 2 ; U 2 |T ) ≤ |Π 1 | + |Π 2 | l .
Now we are going to show that the auctioneer cannot solve the decision problem with large probability based on Lemma H. So e ≥ 1/2 − e −Cm/9 . This basically states that if mutual information between M and D is small, then the probability of M = D is large. Finally we will show that since Pr[D = M ] is large, the algorithm fails to solve the decision problem with large probability. Let W be the indicator variable such that W = 1 if the one of the following three events happens and W = 0 otherwise:
1. αm ≤ SW * (v 1 , v 2 ) < m. Although X i 's are not independent, but it is easy to check that they are negatively correlated. By generalized chernoff bound for negative correlated random variables, we get
X i ≥ αm] ≤ exp(−2(α − 13/18) 2 m) ≤ e −Cm .
Thus in this case, we have P r[SW * (a j 1 , b j 2 ) ≥ αm|M = 0] ≤ e −Cm .
(c) When j 2 = J 2 and j 1 = J 1 : This is similar to the previous case, we can get Pr[SW * (a j 1 , b j 2 ) ≥ αm|M = 0] ≤ e −Cm . (d) When j 1 = J 1 and j 2 = J 2 : Fix S and T . We know E[X i ] = 8/9 when i ∈ S ∩ T .
E[X i ] = 7/9 when i ∈ (T ∩ S c ) ∪ (S ∩ T c ). E[X i ] = 5/9 when i ∈ S c ∩ T c . So
X i ] = 20m/27.
Although X i 's are not independent, but it is easy to check that they are negatively correlated. By generalized chernoff bound for negative correlated random variables, we get 
